Although the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement is often described as the peace accord which ended thirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland, it was one of many on the path to peace. This article proposes to return to the negotiations for peace from a transnational perspective, exploring how the peace process which culminated in the signing of the Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement was reported in France. It focuses on the four main national daily newspapers: the conservative paper, Le Figaro, the organ of the French Communist Party, L'Humanité, the left-wing daily, Libération, and the newspaper of record, Le Monde.
As this study shows, not all French daily newspapers supported the first peace attempts in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the two left-wing publications, L'Humanité and Libération, showed a clear antipathy towards the different reconciliation projects until the early 1990s. These newspapers appeared to be prisoners of their own ideology: Libération defended the idea of a fight for freedom, and supported the Republicans rather than peace, considering that any initiative that did not include the Republicans would fail. L'Humanité, which always saw the Northern Irish conflict as a colonial war, would only support the withdrawal of the British government from Northern Ireland. From the moment Sinn Féin was allowed to participate in the peace process and the British government stated it did not have any strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland, both newspapers supported the British initiatives to find a solution to the conflict. All French publications reported on the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in 1998 and welcomed the 'historical accord'. The first peace attempts did not elicit much interest in the French daily press, especially in the left-wing newspapers. The Sunningdale Agreement was the first attempt to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland, which is why Seamus Mallon famously described the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 as 'the Sunningdale Agreement for slow learners' (McLoughlin, 2012) . 7 The Agreement was signed at Sunningdale, Berkshire, on 9 December 1973 after tripartite talks between the British and Irish governments and the leaders of the moderate Unionist and Nationalist political parties. 8 At the time, the French press preferred to concentrate their reporting on the oil crisis, which was then a major global concern. Only Le Monde and Le Figaro mentioned the Agreement. The left-wing publications reported it only five months later, in May 1974, during the Loyalist strike which triggered the collapse of the power-sharing administration and the repeal of the Agreement (see Fisk, 1975) .
When they did converge on this story, the French daily publications found themselves divided on the accord: whereas Le Monde and Le Figaro indicated some cautious optimism and clear support for it (Wetz, 1973; Bernheim, 1973; Mulholland, 7 . J., 1974; Thomas, 1974a) . The efforts of the British government to negotiate a settlement in the province, which were commended in the other French newspapers, were not mentioned in Libération. On the contrary, the newspaper's permanent correspondent in London, Marc Thomas, accused the British authorities of deliberately letting the Loyalists destroy the power-sharing Agreement (1974a Agreement ( , 1974b Agreement ( , 1974c . Thomas claimed that the IRA was not unhappy to see this Agreement collapse (1974d, 1974e (Mulholland, 1983: 6; Cornu, 1983: 5) . In its leader column from 4
May 1984 entitled 'Hope for a new Ireland', the newspaper explained why it granted so much importance to the Forum: it was the first serious attempt to define Irish nationalism while taking into consideration the existence of a Protestant identity on the island. Joe Mulholland (1984: 4-5) 1985c, 1985d, 1985e to achieve its aim and trigger a spectacular U-turn in Margaret Thatcher's attitude (Chauvel, 1985a (Chauvel, , 1985d Libération praised 'John Hume's courage and perseverance' (Chalandon, 1993a: 23) as well as Gerry Adams' willingness to get his party out of political isolation (Chalandon, 1993a: 23; Dupuy, 1993: 3, leader) . The French daily published an interview with both leaders (Chalandon, 1993b; Rousselot, 1993b) . Its correspondents in Belfast, Sorj Chalandon and Fabrice Rousselot, also managed to get an exclusive interview with ' a member of the IRA army council', in which the organisation asserted that it would 'support a peace process based on the Hume-Adams initiative'. The
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Council has agreed to answer questions from an international newspaper since the start of the Troubles more than twenty years ago' (Chalandon & Rousselot, 1993: 15-16) . Libération, which never hid its preference for the Republican point of view, supported an initiative which enabled the Republican movement to take part in the search for a settlement in Northern Ireland. However, while the left-wing daily presented the Nationalist/Republican point of view, it did not report on the Unionists' reactions, unlike Le Monde (Zecchini, 1993a (Zecchini, , 1993b . The latter also published an interview which presented John Hume as ' an idealist' and a ' conciliator' (Zecchini, 1993d: 3), but failed to interview Gerry Adams. The paper justified the importance of this dialogue by referring to US President Clinton's support and involvement in the peace process (Zecchini, 1993f) . L'Humanité also considered these talks as ' an important peace initiative' (Avis, 1993d: 11) and the only way forward to eliminate violence (Avis, 1993a), which is why it severely criticised John Major's attitude for rejecting these propositions without offering any alternative (Avis, 1993b).
These three newspapers constantly asserted that there could not be any solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland without 'the men of violence' being involved in a political process. It was therefore not surprising that they supported the British government's secret talks with the IRA. Unlike most of the British press, not a single French publication disputed these contacts. Instead they considered that talking to paramilitary organisations was the ultimate condition to a solid agreement.
Consequently, they unanimously welcomed the British authorities' renouncement of their 'never talk to terrorists' principle (Zecchini, 1993c Duplouich, 1993a Duplouich, , 1993b Avis, 1993c Avis, , 1993d Rousselot, 1993a; Chalandon, 1993c; LeMonde, 1993) . For the first time, even the left-wing press showed some enthusiasm for the talks.
Indeed, for L'Humanité, they were ' a feeble ray of hope for a harshly affected people', and its reporter hoped for ' a better modus vivendi with the Republic of Ireland and the creation of democratised structures to administer the North' (Avis, 1991a: 11). As for Libération, it declared: 'these talks represent some progress for the six counties' (Guichoux, 1991a: 14) . On the one hand, these two publications praised the British government for its efforts (Avis, 1991b; Guichoux, 1991a) , which was a significant change in their attitude, but on the other hand, they accused the government of bias: the British had excluded Sinn Féin for supporting IRA violence, but they did not exclude the Loyalists who also supported their paramilitaries' acts of violence (Chalandon, 1991d) . Like the other newspapers, they both castigated the Unionists'
'intransigence', 'sectarianism', and hypocrisy (Chalandon, 1991d: 27; Avis, 1991b: 13) .
Sorj Chalandon of Libération claimed that their only intention was 'to obtain the suspension of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985' (Chalandon, 1991d: 27) . Libération produced a series of articles under the title 'Portraits of Ordinary Families of Ireland' (Chalandon, 1991a (Chalandon, , 1991b (Chalandon, , 1991c Guichoux, 1991b) . What is striking, however, is Le Monde, these documents were 'more daring than expected' (De Beer, 1995b: 3).
While reminding his readers that these texts were ' a basis for negotiations', and not an Anglo-Irish treaty, the London correspondent thought that they were ' a good compromise that safeguards both the Irish ideal of reunification and London's willingness to guarantee the interests of the Protestant majority in the North' Duplouich, 1995b) . That is why he approved of John Major's ' clever initiative', which consisted of inviting the population 'to make up their mind on the proposed solutions' (Duplouich, 1995a: 3). L'Humanité denounced the hypocrisy of the Unionists who, according to its reporters, were pretending to be open to dialogue in order not to cut themselves off from their electorate, but had absolutely no desire to accept any change (Guichard & Avis, 1995) . To show the contrast between the two camps, the communist daily referred to the 'hand of friendship that Gerry Adams extended to the Unionists', inviting them to 'join the Republican movement to build a new society of peace and justice in their shared country'. Yet, according to the correspondent, this hand 'has no chance of being accepted by the Unionists' (Avis, 1995b: 14) . Libération also insisted on Sinn Féin's willingness to open a dialogue with the Unionists (Chalandon, 1995a (Chalandon, : 11, 1995b and on the 'gap between the Unionist MPs and the Protestant grassroots' in its article about the reaction on the Shankill Road (Amoric, 1995: 11) .
At this time the French reporters placed the responsibility for peace on the Unionists, whose image in the French press had seriously deteriorated. This image did not improve during the multi-party negotiations. Indeed, French journalists did not hide their frustration at the Unionists' 'blackmailing' of John Major's government, which needed their votes in Westminster in order to survive (De Beer, 1996a , 1996b Duplouich, 1996; Avis, 1996a Avis, , 1996b Chalandon, 1996; Amalric, 1996) . When the IRA ceasefire came to an end on 9 February 1996, the French newspapers unanimously blamed the Unionists and the British government. It was only in May 1997 after Tony
Blair's landslide victory at the general election that they became hopeful again. They The role of the newly elected British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in solving the conflict was unanimously acknowledged by the French press. Le Monde praised his determination, his boldness (De Beer, 1998b , 1998c , and Le Figaro lauded his ' dynamism, his power of persuasion to end an archaic conflict and his political drive' (Duplouich, 1998: 2) . In its leader column on 13 April 1998, Paul Guilbert talked about ' a typical English operation', wondering 'which continental lawyer would have imagined such a status'. He praised Tony Blair's efficiency and even predicted that he would 'become the man that Europe envies'. Even Libération, which had in the past displayed in its columns some strong anti-British feelings, asserted that 'in contrast with his predecessors whose Northern Ireland policy was antinationalist repression, [Tony Blair] contributed to break all the political taboos that froze the situation' (Chalandon, 1998a: 5) . Clinton's personal intervention (Zecchini, 1998; Duplouich, 1998b; Duraud, 1998a; Amalric, 1998) . As for Northern Irish politicians, John Hume's role in the peace process was unanimously lauded, but Le Monde also gave credit to Gerry Adams (De Beer, 1998a) . The Unionist leader David Trimble triggered a mixed reaction in the French press: if he was presented as a 'modernist' or a 'moderate', it was solely because of the fact that there was always someone more intransigent than him in his own camp (De Beer, 1998a: 2; Duplouich, 1998b: 2; Duraud, 1998a: 4 ' (Duraud, 1998b: 9) .
While displaying enthusiasm, French journalists also mentioned their fear regarding the viability of the Agreement. Numerous reports described a population suspended between hope and pessimism, refusing to show any euphoria or joy, and fearing that some dissident group might try to sabotage the Agreement by a series of bombings (Paringaux, 1998a; Duplouich, 1998d; Duraud, 1998b; Rousselot, 1998a Rousselot, , 1998b . In its leader column from 12/13 April 1998, Le Monde reminded its readers that ' a peace agreement does not automatically make peace'. Le Figaro also asserted that ' a lot of time and courage will be necessary to abolish the barriers that have been erected in hearts and minds for the last 70 years' (Duplouich,1998a: 3). Its reporter explained that the Agreement was ' a political act' and that 'the most difficult things remain to be done', namely to ' convince the population, get the new institutions working and neutralise the extremists' (Duplouich, 1998d: 3). L'Humanité mentioned that the Agreement remained 'fragile and precarious'
because 'sealed on a piece of paper, peace still has to be built in a country that has been divided by twenty-nine years of war and four centuries of English colonisation' (Duraud, 1998a: 3) . In his leader on 13 April 1998, Christophe Deroubaix warned that ' ending the social apartheid in the streets, shops, offices, [and] companies, will be a long-term endeavour'. Jacques Amalric from Libération also wrote in his leader on 11/12 April 1998 that 'it is premature to celebrate peace. It remains to be built'. He then explained: 'the agreement reflects more the willingness of London, Dublin, and
Washington to end an anachronistic conflict than a real willingness to compromise from those who have been fighting each other for three decades'. All papers reported the worrying division within each camp, Ian Paisley's ferocious opposition to the Agreement, and the radical Republicans ready to 'kill the peace ' (Paringaux, 1998b; Duplouich, 1998e; Duraud, 1998d; Sergent, 1998c Although the final chapter of the Agreement's history is still to be written, French journalists consider that Brexit and the DUP deal could put the Good Friday Agreement at risk (Papin & Bernard, 2017; Bernard, 2017a Bernard, , 2017b Lemahieu, 2017a Lemahieu, , 2017b Collomp, 2017a Collomp, , 2017b Delesalle-Stolper, 2017a , 2017b Labaune, 2017) .
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